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Abstract In Thinking and Acting John Pollock offers some criticisms of Bayesian
epistemology, and he defends an alternative understanding of the role of probability
in epistemology. Here, I defend the Bayesian against some of Pollock’s criticisms,
and I discuss a potential problem for Pollock’s alternative account.
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John Pollock did a lot of interesting and important work on the metaphysics and
epistemology of probability over several decades. In Thinking About Acting
(Pollock 2006), we find many fascinating and thought provoking ideas and
arguments (both old and new) about probability. Owing to limitations of space, I
will be confining my remarks to a handful of issues addressed in Pollock (2006)
pertaining to probability, logic, and epistemology. First, I will discuss some of
Pollock’s arguments against Bayesian Epistemology (BE). Here, I’ll try to defend
(BE) from what I take to be less than decisive objections. Then, I will make some
critical remarks concerning Pollock’s alternative approach to ‘‘probabilistic
epistemology’’, which is based on his (non-Bayesian) theory of ‘‘nomic probability’’
(Pollock 1990).1
B. Fitelson (&)
Department of Philosophy, University of California-Berkeley, 314 Moses Hall #2390, Berkeley,
CA 94720-2390, USA
e-mail: branden@fitelson.org
1 I regret that I will not have a chance here to discuss Pollock’s theory of ‘‘causal probability’’ (and its
application to ‘‘causal decision theory’’), which is one of the newest (and most exciting) ideas in the book.
And, I’m sad that I won’t get to talk to John about any of my queries. I’m sure he would have had many
illuminating answers. He always did.
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1 Some remarks on Pollock’s critique of Bayesian epistemology
In Chap. 6, Pollock offers various criticisms of (BE). Before delving into some of
Pollock’s criticisms, I would like to begin by pointing out some puzzling things
Pollock says about the probability calculus. This will lead, naturally, into a more
substantive discussion of Pollock’s critique of (BE). According to Pollock (2006,
p. 83), the probability calculus can be axiomatized as follows:
(1) PROBðP & PÞ ¼ 0:
(2) PROBðP _ PÞ ¼ 1:
(3) PROBðP _ QÞ ¼ PROB(P) ? PROB(Q) - PROB(P & Q).
(4) If P and Q are logically equivalent, then PROB(P) = PROB(Q)
Pollock claims that the above axiomatization is equivalent to Kolmogorov’s
probability calculus (PC) (Kolmogorov 1956).2 In fact, Pollock’s intended
interpretation of his axiomatization—which I’ll call (PC0), for short—is logically
incomparable to (PC). That is, (i) there are some theorems of (PC) that are not
theorems of (PC0), and (ii) there are some theorems of (PC0) that are not theorems of
(PC). Let’s take (ii) first. The probability calculus defines probability functions
PROB() over sentential languages L. As such, if (PC0) is to be equivalent to (PC),
then the (schematic) axioms (1)–(4) must be relativized to some such L. That is, the
metavariables ‘‘P’’ and ‘‘Q’’ in Pollock’s (1)–(4) must be understood as ranging
over sentences of some sentential language L. If we do not do this, then we may
falsely interpret ‘‘logically equivalent’’ in (4) as something stronger than
‘‘tautologically equivalent in L’’ which is all ‘‘logically equivalent’’ means in
(PC). [As we’ll see shortly, Pollock’s critique of (BE) makes use of just such a
stronger reading of the locution ‘‘logically equivalent’’ in (4).] As a result, (PC0)
contains ‘‘theorems’’ that are not theorems of (PC). For instance, Pollock’s (PC0)
will entail that PROB(P) = PROB(Q), for many P and Q that are not even expressible
in any sentential language L (e.g., first-order or higher-order equivalences). I’ll
return to this, below, in my discussion of Pollock’s critique of (BE). But, first, let me
illustrate (i). The following is an axiom of Kolmogorovian (PC) (Fitelson 2008):
(5) For all P 2 L; PROB(P C 0).
Unfortunately, (5) is not a theorem of (PC0)—even when it is (properly) restricted to
sentential languagesL. To see this, we can construct a simple counterexample to (5) in
a properly L-relativized version of (PC0). Let L contain just one atomic sentence A.
Hence, only four distinct propositions can be expressed in L: A, *A, A & A, and
A _ A. Now, let PROB() be defined on L, as follows:
(6) PROBðAÞ ¼ 2
(7) PROBðAÞ ¼ 1
(8) PROBðA _ AÞ ¼ 1
2 Strictly speaking, Kolmogorov gives a set-theoretic, and not a logical axiomatization of (PC). But, one
can give an (extensionally) equivalent logical axiomatization. See Fitelson (2008, Sect. 1) for an
axiomatization of (PC) that is along these lines.
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(9) PROBðA & AÞ ¼ 0
This hL; PROBi pair satisfies all of Pollock’s (PC0) axioms (1)–(4), but it also violates
Kolmogorov’s (5), since PROBðAÞ ¼ 1\0.3 Therefore, Pollock’s (PC0) is both
too strong [(ii)] and too weak [(i)] to be a proper candidate for an equivalent
formulation of (PC). Problem (i) is easily fixed, by adding (5) as an axiom to a
properly L-relativized rendition of (PC0). But, problem (ii) is deeper and more
intertwined with Pollock’s thinking about Bayesianism. If we fix problem (ii) by
limiting the axioms of (PC0) to sentential languages L—and we bear this limitation
in mind when we apply (PC0) to (BE)—then some of Pollock’s central criticisms of
(BE) will be threatened. Allow me to explain.
One of Pollock’s main lines of criticism of (BE) is that it entails a kind of
logical omniscience. As he rightly points out (Pollock 2006, p. 94), some necessary
truths seem (intuitively) unjustified for some epistemically rational agents (S). But,
Pollock claims, Bayesian epistemology cannot make sense of this, if it is to use
PROB(p) as a way of gauging the degree to which p is justified (for S). He says:
If Q is a necessary truth, it is logically equivalent to (P _ P), so it follows
from axioms (2) and (4) that every necessary truth has a PROB of 1.
I think this is highly uncharitable to the Bayesian epistemologist. First, this rests on
a misunderstanding of (PC), which only entails that tautologies of L must be
assigned a PROB of 1. Second, it rests on an implausible assumption about
‘‘necessary truths’’—that they are all logically equivalent to the simple tautology
P _ P. I’m not sure what Pollock has in mind here, but I don’t see why a
Bayesian (or anyone else) should be saddled with such a strong commitment. As a
result, it’s unclear what reason Bayesians could have for insisting that all necessary
truths be assigned the same probability as a tautology. It seems to me that there are
better ways to think about (PC) and (BE).
Garber (1983) explains how (PC)—when properly construed and applied—can
be used by Bayesian epistemologists to model logically non-omniscient agents.
And, he uses his approach to give a novel and compelling resolution of the so-called
‘‘old evidence problem’’ of Bayesian confirmation theory (a branch of Bayesian
epistemology). I won’t get into the details of Garber’s approach here. But, I’ll give
the basic idea behind it. Pollock’s criticism presupposes a very rich notion of
‘‘logical equivalence’’ in his interpretation of (PC). As I have explained, however,
(PC) has an impoverished notion of ‘‘logical equivalence’’—tautological equiva-
lence in some sentential L (Fitelson 2008). While this impoverishment may seem
like a shortcoming4—it can be a virtue. It allows Bayesian epistemologists to model
3 Pollock is in good company here. Skyrms’s (1999, Chap. 6) axiomatization has exactly the same
deficiency. I owe this counterexample to Skyrms’s (and Pollock’s) theory to Mike Titelbaum. As Carnap
(1962, p. 341) notes, it is surprisingly easy to give equivalent-looking axioms for (PC), which are non-
equivalent. This happens a lot in the literature on (PC).
4 A bit later in the text, Pollock discusses a related logical impoverishment of (PC), and he complains that
it is a shortcoming. On page 108, Pollock rightly points out that (PC) does not say anything
(systematically) about PROBabilities over open first-order sentences. This is true, of course. But,
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agents who may only be omniscient about the tautologies of some sentential
language L. By exploiting the fact that atomic sentences are not tautologically
related to each other, we can then use this ‘‘impoverishment’’ to model ignorance of
‘‘higher’’ logical truths, which are not expressible in L. Following Garber, we can
do so by extra-systematically interpreting the atomic sentences of L. For instance,
we could have a language with three atomic sentences A, B, and C, where ‘‘C’’ gets
extra-systematically interpreted as ‘‘A entails B’’, and where this ‘‘entailment’’ is
(say) first-order (but not sentential). Then, we could add extra-systematic
probabilistic constraints to our probability model, which would selectively capture
such ‘‘higher’’ logical knowledge on the part of the agent being modeled. For
example, by adding the following extra-systematic constraint, we can model an
agent who knows that ‘‘modus ponens’’ for ‘‘entails’’ is extra-systematically valid
(in this instance):
(10) PROBðB j A & CÞ ¼ 1:
We could also allow this conditional PROB to be less than 1, in which case we’d be
modeling an agent who is ignorant of this ‘‘extra-systematic modus ponens’’. In this
way, we can model agents who are justified in believing some extra-systematic
(logical, conceptual, or other) necessary truths, but not others. And, that gives a
sophisticated Bayesian epistemologist the wherewithal to overcome this criticism of
Pollock. Of course, Garber’s framework still presupposes some logical omniscience,
and this leaves the Bayesian vulnerable to some objections. Indeed, Pollock (2006,
p. 94) rightly points out that sometimes people aren’t even justified in believing
some tautologies in simple languages L. And, that problem will still plague even a
Garberian approach to Bayesian epistemology.5 However, as Pollock himself notes
(Pollock 2006, p. 95), tautologies are always warranted. So, presumably, Pollock’s
logical omniscience objection would not undermine a Garberian application of PROB
to the modeling of degrees of warrant. In any case, Pollock has another objection to
this sort of Bayesian epistemology.
According to Pollock, Bayesian epistemologists who claim that PROB is a measure
of degree of warrant (or justification) are unable to explain the role of reasoning in
epistemology. Pollock seems to think that the following is a desideratum for any
adequate (formal) epistemology (Pollock 2006, p. 95):
(11) Any adequate (formal) epistemology must be able to explain why deductive
inference from multiple uncertain premises can be expected to preserve
justification (and/or warrant).
Footnote 4 continued
something much stronger is true—namely that (PC) doesn’t say anything (systematically) about
PROBabilities over anything other than sentential languages L:
5 Having conceded this point, it is worth mentioning that this problem is far less pressing than the
problem Pollock has in mind—which would saddle proponents of (BE) with the commitment to assign
probability 1 to all necessary truths. The main point I want to get across here is that proponents of (BE)
have the theoretical tools to distinguish various ‘‘levels’’ of ideal epistemic rationality. As such, their
framework is not as hopeless as Pollock makes it sound.
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Pollock argues that (BE) is unable to meet requirement (11). He says (Pollock 2006,
p. 97):
If degrees of warrant satisfy the probability calculus, then ... we can only be
confident that a deductive argument takes us from warranted premises to a
warranted conclusion if all the inferences are probabilistically valid.
where, an inference of the form P1; . . .; Pn )Q is probabilistically valid just in case
its conclusion Q is at least as probable as its least probable premise—that is, iff for
all i: PROB(Q) C PROB(Pi). As it turns out, no deductively valid form of inference
with more than one premise is probabilistically valid in this sense. That explains
why Pollock thinks Bayesian epistemology cannot satisfy (11). The reason Pollock
thinks violating (11) is undesirable is that he thinks violating (11) prevents
probabilism from being able to explain how we can reason ‘‘blindly’’ from multiple
warranted (or justified) premises, using a deductively valid inference, and expect
that the conclusion will also be warranted (or justified). Since ‘‘blind deductive
reasoning’’ seems integral to epistemology, this would be a serious shortcoming of
(BE)—or, more generally, of any probabilistic epistemology.
Strictly speaking, it is true that Bayesianism so construed can’t satisfy (11) in this
sense. But, I wonder why one would want to both construe Bayesian epistemology
in this way, and understand ‘‘probabilistic validity’’ in this way. It seems clear to me
that many contemporary Bayesian epistemologists would neither want to equate
PROB and degree of warrant (or degree of justification, for that matter) nor
explicate probabilistic validity in the way Pollock proposes. Let’s take the second
point first. There is quite a long tradition of what is known as probability logic
(PL). In recent years, probability-logicians like Adams (1975, 1996) and Hailperin
(1996) have done a great deal of work on various notions of ‘‘probabilistic validity’’.
Two important points about (PL) are in order here. First, the notion of ‘‘probabilistic
validity’’ that is typically used in (PL) circles is not the one Pollock has in mind.
Adams (1975, p. 57) defines a different notion, which I will call PROB-validity. I
won’t give his definition of PROB-validity here, but I will discuss one important
consequence of the definition, just to give a sense of how it differs from Pollock’s
‘‘probabilistic validity’’. Let u(p) = 1 - PROB(p) be the uncertainty of p. And,
consider an inference of the form P1; . . .; Pn )Q. Such an inference will be PROB-
valid in Adams’s sense only if6 the uncertainty of the conclusion is no greater than
the sum of the uncertainties of the premises—that is, only if uðQÞ Pni¼1 uðPiÞ. In
other words, the uncertainty of the conclusion of a PROB-valid inference will never
exceed the sum-total of the uncertainties of its premises. Moreover, it is a
fundamental theorem of (PL) that all deductively valid arguments are PROB-valid.
So, in this sense, a Bayesian (probabilist) who adopts Adams’s notion of PROB-
validity, can explain why (in one precise sense) conclusions of deductively valid
inferences will never be more unwarranted (or more unjustified) than the premises
already were. Of course, this presupposes a different epistemic explanandum than
Pollock has in mind in (11). But, in the interest of giving (PC) and (BE) a fair
6 This is only a necessary condition for PROB-validity, which is why it is not suitable as a definition
(Adams 1975, p. 57).
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hearing, it is worth noting that other notions of ‘‘probabilistic validity’’ have been
investigated by people who are interested in just the sort of deductive inferences
from multiple uncertain premises that Pollock is talking about. Putting these
alternative (PL)-investigations of ‘‘uncertain deductive inference’’ to one side, I
want to make a second point about (PL)—that it can be illuminating, even with
respect to Pollock’s explanandum [(11)].
Consider modus ponens for material implication ‘‘’’ (‘‘-MP’’, for short). This
is a very common and important multi-premise deductive inference that (I take it) is
used often in the sort of ‘‘blind’’ deductive reasoning Pollock has in mind. Given
Pollock’s definition, -MP is not ‘‘probabilistically valid’’. But, (PL) allows us to
be more precise in our ‘‘diagnosis’’. Here is a (PL)-fact about -MP:
(12) If PROBðPÞ[ 1   and PROBðP  QÞ[ 1  , then PROBðQÞ[ 1  2.7
This is a classical theorem of (PL) (Hailperin 1996, p. 205). While (12) entails that
some degree of PROB can be ‘‘lost’’ in (material) modus ponens inferences, it also
tells us that, when the premises are highly probable, the amount of PROB that can be
lost in -MP is rather small. Now, imagine a Bayesian epistemologist who wants to
defend the claim that degree of justification dj (or degree of warrant dw) is a PROB.
I don’t think someone like this is at a complete loss to explain (even on Pollock’s
terms) how -MP can often be ‘‘blindly’’ applied, while preserving justified-ness (or
warranted-ness). Let us (naı¨vely) assume the following PROB-reduction of justified-
ness (or warranted-ness):
(13) S is justified (warranted) in believing p iff PROBðpÞ[ 1  2, for some
suitably ‘‘small’’ ; and, S is highly justified (warranted) in believing p iff
PROBðpÞ[ 1  .8
In light of (12), a Bayesian who endorses (13) can explain how we may ‘‘blindly’’
do -MP—in cases where the premises are all highly justified, since (12) entails
that if the premises of a -MP-inference are all highly justified, then the conclusion
must be justified. Granted, this isn’t as general an explanation of ‘‘blind -MP’’ as a
Bayesian would have if -MP were ‘‘probabilistically valid’’ in Pollock’s sense.
But, I don’t see why this isn’t explanatory at all—even with respect to Pollock’s
explanandum (or an explanandum that is very similar to Pollock’s). A similar
strategy can be employed for -transitivity, in light of the following classical
theorem of (PL) (Hailperin 1996, p. 205):
7 I haven’t said anything yet about the interpretation of PROB. This is intentional. It seems to me that
Pollock’s objections are not restricted to (say) subjective (BE). Rather, he’s taking on just about any kind
of PROBabilistic reduction of dj or dw. I presume this would include non-subjective probabilists about
evidential support, such as Carnap (1962), Williamson (2000), and Keynes (1921), as well as subjective
(BE)—ers, such as Skyrms (1999), Joyce (2009), and others. I’ll return to this issue in Sect. 2. But, in the
meantime, I will assume that PROB is whatever probability function a particular advocate of (BE) has in
mind. This will vary, but in a way that is orthogonal to this line of Pollock’s objections.
8 Of course, I do not mean to endorse (13), nor do I mean to saddle the proponent of (BE) with it. I am




(14) If PROBðP  QÞ[ 1   and PROBðQ  RÞ[ 1  , then PROBðP  RÞ[
1  2.
Furthermore, if we talk about indicative modus ponens (?-MP), rather than
material modus ponens (-MP), then things get even more interesting.9 Many
people (Adams 1975; Bennett 2003; Edgington 1995) think that the probability of
the indicative conditional P ? Q goes according to the conditional probability
PROBðQ j PÞ. If that’s right, then we get an even better result of (PL) for the
dialectical purposes at hand, namely:
(15) If PROBðPÞ[ 1   and PROBðP ! QÞ = PROBðQ j PÞ[ 1  , then PROB(Q)
[ ð1  Þ2.
That is, supposing that ?-MP is valid and that the equation PROBðP ! QÞ =
PROBðQ j PÞ is correct, this means that even less PROB can be ‘‘lost’’ in ?-MP
inferences than in -MP inferences. And, so, the analogous Bayesian strategy is
even more explanatory (in Pollock’s sense) in that case. There are limits to this
strategy, since some multi-premise deductive arguments won’t even be guaranteed
to preserve warrant/justification in cases where all the premises are highly
warranted/justified. But, there is a fully general theory of ‘‘probability logic’’, which
furnishes such results for many classically deductively valid argument forms
(Hailperin 1996). To my mind, this (to some extent) softens the impact of Pollock’s
objection to thinking of degree of justification or degree of warrant as a PROB.
Finally, I want to return to the question of whether Bayesians should (or do) think
of degree of justification (or warrant) as a PROB-function. I think many contemporary
Bayesians would not want to do this, but for reasons that are independent of the
considerations we just discussed in connection with Pollock’s objection. Bayesian
epistemologists typically distinguish two types of ‘‘evidential support’’ or ‘‘confir-
mation’’—firmness and increase in firmness (Carnap 1962, new preface):
• Confirmation as firmness. E confirmsf H, relative to background evidence K if
and only if PROBðH j E & KÞ[ t, for some threshold value t (typically, t [ 1/2).
• Confirmation as increase in firmness. E confirmsi H, relative to background
evidence K if and only if PROBðH j E & KÞ[ PROBðH j KÞ.
The firmness concept is sometimes called ‘‘absolute’’ confirmation, and the increase
in firmness concept is sometimes called ‘‘incremental’’ confirmation. The distinction
between them is just the distinction between high conditional probability versus
probabilistic relevance. While these two concepts are closely related to each other,
they can come apart in some rather important ways. Here is an example (to which
I’ll return in Sect. 2) that illustrates the confirmsf/confirmsi distinction.
9 Various commentators have recently come to the view that ?-MP isn’t even deductively valid (McGee
1985; Kolodny et al. 2009). I will put that controversy to one side here, and I will suppose that modus
ponens is deductively valid for the indicative conditional. But, it is worth noting that, if these
commentators are right, then ‘‘blind deductive ?-MP reasoning’’ would not be kosher. I think that would
undermine Pollock’s dialectical position vis-a-vis (BE). But, I can’t go into that here.
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The example involves a 35-year old American man named Jim, who has received
a positive test result for a rare disease X. Only 1 in 10,000 35-year-old males in the
U.S. has disease X. But, the test for X is very highly reliable—it has very low false-
positive and false-negative rates (each of these error rates is 1/1000). That is, if you
have disease X, then there is only a 1/1000 chance of a false negative from an X-test,
and if you don’t have X, then there is only a 1/1000 chance of a false positive from
an X-test. Let a denote Jim, let Nx assert that x does not have disease X, and let Px
assert that x has received a (single) positive test result for disease X. In this case, we
(intuitively) have the following probabilistic facts, where K is the background
evidence contained in the above story about Jim, the disease, and the test (and PROB
may be interpreted in various ways10):
• PROBðNa j Pa & KÞ is high (specifically, it’s approximately 9/10).
• PROBðNa j Pa & KÞ is significantly less than PROBðNa j KÞ.
In other words, Pa confirmsf Na, relative to K; but Pa disconfirmsi Na, relative to K.
Question: does Pa constitute a reason to believe Na (given background knowledge
K)? On the one hand (the firmness hand), Na is highly probable, given Pa (and K).
On the other hand (the increase in firmness hand), Pa is strongly negatively relevant
to the probability of Na (given K). This conflict between confirmsf and disconfirmsi
seems to pull intuitions about whether Pa is a reason to believe Na in opposite
directions. Many advocates of (BE) seem to endorse the following.11
(16) A necessary condition for E’s counting as a reason to believe H (or for it
being reasonable to believe H on the basis of E), given background evidence/
knowledge K, is that E does not disconfirmi H, relative to K.
If (16) is correct, then Pa would not count as a reason to believe Na (and we would
not be warranted/justified in believing Na on the basis of Pa), given background
knowledge K—despite the fact that PROBðNa j Pa & KÞ is high.12 This sort of
consideration seems to have led various advocates of (BE) to reject the idea that the
degree to which E justifies/warrants H (relative to background knowledge K) is
PROBðH j E & KÞ. And, this consideration is orthogonal to the considerations raised
by Pollock’s objections concerning ‘‘blind (uncertain) deductive reasoning’’. This
example also provides a nice segue´ into Sect. 2, where I will appeal to similar
considerations to pose a challenge to Pollock’s alternative ‘‘probabilistic
epistemology’’.
10 As I explained in footnote 7, I am remaining as neutral as possible on the interpretation of PROB here. I
will return to this issue in Sect. 2. In this example, I think the probabilistic ‘‘facts’’ I cite are robust across
various interpretations of PROB. And, I think I’m not doing any harm here to Pollock’s usage of PROB for
definite probabilities.
11 White (2006, Sect. 5) seems to assume something like (16) in his Bayesian criticism of epistemic
dogmatism. Williamson (2000, Chaps. 9 and 10) seems to require some probabilistic relevance in his
account of ‘‘justification’’. And, Shogenji (2009) defends a precise, probabilistic theory of dj; according to
which dj is not a confirmsf-function (i.e., not a conditional PROB function), but rather a confirmsi–function.
I’m inclined to think that that a proper Bayesian theory of dj (if there be such) will have to be sensitive to
both firmness and increase in firmness considerations.




2 Some worries about Pollock’s alternative ‘‘probabilistic epistemology’’
Pollock rejects (BE), but he still thinks that probabilities (of some kind) are
important in epistemology. Pollock’s alternative is what I will call a theory of
defeasible probabilistic reasoning (DPR). Pollock’s (DPR) has three main compo-
nents, each of which differs in important ways from (BE).
The first component of Pollock’s (DPR) involves indefinite probabilities. The
probability calculus (and the example we discussed above) involves only definite
probabilities—probabilities over closed sentences (i.e., propositions). Pollock’s
(DPR) theory involves nomic probability (Pollock 1990) functions prob, which
(formally) take open sentences as arguments. For instance, probðNx j PxÞ is
meaningful in Pollock’s theory, and it denotes ‘‘the proportion of physically
possible P’s that would be N’s’’. So, Pollock is talking about a kind of objective,
physical probability, which is indefinite. This differs from the PROB’s of (BE) in
several respects. First, the PROB’s of (BE) are (in some sense) epistemic
probabilities. And, while there is disagreement among advocates of (BE) as to
whether epistemic probabilities are subjective or objective (see footnote 7), it is
clear that PROB’s are not physical probabilities. Second, Pollock’s prob’s are
indefinite, while (BE)’s PROB’s are definite. This is also important, since both
Pollock and the advocates of (BE) want to make inferences about particulars.
Pollock will do this via defeasible reasoning from his indefinite, nomic prob’s (plus
definite statements about particulars) to (other) definite statements about particulars.
Bayesians will do this via direct appeals to definite PROBabalistic ‘‘facts’’. Finally,
Pollock’s indefinite probabilities formally differ from (PC)’s PROB’s in various
ways. Pollock has developed a sophisticated formal theory of prob, as well as some
ingenious computer programs for calculating and proving general claims about
prob’s. Unfortunately, I don’t have the space to discuss any of that formal work
here.13 Next, I will illustrate how Pollock’s (DPR) approach differs from (BE) on
our example above. But, first, I need to mention the other two components of
Pollock’s theory of defeasible probabilistic reasoning.
The second component of Pollock’s (DPR) will require some account of how we
can come to know the (true) values of (or, at least, ranges of values of or inequalities
involving) salient nomic probabilities. Among other things, this will have to give us
some grip on how we might come to know something about the ‘‘true
proportionality function q over nomologically possible worlds’’. I put this locution
in quotation marks, because I am rather skeptical that there are such proportionality
functions, and/or that we can come to know what they are. But, because my space is
limited here, I won’t be able to get into the (rather extensive) metaphysical and
epistemological worries I have about ‘‘proportions of nomologically possible
worlds’’-talk. Pollock does have a lot to say about this second component. And, I
refer the interested reader to his 1990 book on nomic probability (Pollock 1990).
13 Pollock has made a lot of progress on the formal/computational side of his theory since the book was
written. I have had the pleasure of reading a more recent manuscript (Pollock 2009), which develops the
formal side in much more detail and generality. I have also benefited from a very edifying email
correspondence with John about his quite extensive and impressive computational work on prob, and its
relation to my recent computational work on PROB (Fitelson 2008).
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The third component (and the most salient one for my purposes here) of Pollock’s
(DPR) involves principles of defeasible reasoning from facts about particulars ?
facts about nomic probabilities to further facts about particulars. Pollock discusses
various principles of this kind throughout his work on nomic probability. I will
focus on just one of these, which is central to his approach—the so-called statistical
syllogism (SS). Pollock gives various formulations of (SS) in his work. I will use the
following formulation from the book (Pollock 2006, p. 235), which is most
convenient for my purposes:
(SS) If F is projectible with respect to G and r [ 0.5, then
‘‘Gc & probðFx j GxÞ r’’ is a defeasible reason for believing ‘‘Fc’’, the
strength of the reason depending upon the value of r.
Let’s apply (SS) to our example above, where we will just take the description of
Jim, the disease, and the test as part of our background knowledge. Then, I presume,
we have a case in which we ought to be able to apply (SS). First, I presume that our
background knowledge will (somehow) allow us to know the salient nomic
probability probðNx j PxÞ. Specifically, I presume (and hope) it turns out that we
can know that probðNx j PxÞ[ 0:5. Indeed, I presume (and hope) it turns out that
we can know this nomic probability is around 0.9 in the example at hand.14 Then, it
seems to me that (SS) should imply the following, in our example (since I take it we
have projectibility here as well):
(17) Pa is a defeasible reason to believe Na (given what we know about the
example in question). Moreover, Pa is a strong (defeasible) reason to believe
Na (and we can make it as strong a reason as we like, just by turning-up the
numbers in our background story about the case).
On its face, (17) suggests that a positive test result from a highly reliable test
provides an (arbitrarily) strong reason to believe that the disease is absent.15 I find
that counter-intuitive. And, I think the story that advocates of (BE) tell about
confirmsf versus confirmsi furnishes a pretty plausible explanation of why (17)
sounds counter-intuitive. Moreover, as far as I can tell, Pollock’s (DPR)-theory
doesn’t have any obvious way of explaining what’s going on here. It sounds wrong
(to my ear) to say that Pa does support Na, but that this support is somehow
defeated by something else. On the contrary, it seems to me that Pa (defeasibly)
counter-supports Na in this context.
14 Here, I mean only to assume some uncontroversial direct inference principle from what we take to be
the salient sorts of objective probabilities in the context at hand. One might object that the kinds of
(statistical) probabilities at work in the present example aren’t nomic probabilities (in Pollock’s sense).
But, one can strengthen the present (statistical) example by adapting it to a case in which one property is
nomologically necessary for another. For instance, we could let Px x has stage one syphilis, and Nx x
does not develop paresis (Scriven 1959, p. 480). I presume that the salient nomic probabilities in such an
example would have the same sort of structure I have in mind for the simpler (statistical) case I am
discussing here [and it would more clearly involve a case of (projectible) nomic probabilities].
15 Or, in the syphilis/paresis variation of the example (see footnote 14), that the presence of stage one
syphilis in a patient is a (arbitrarily strong) reason to believe that the patient will not develop paresis.
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I wish I had more space to discuss other aspects of Pollock’s (DPR) theory, not to
mention his theory of ‘‘causal probability’’ and his new approach to decision theory.
There is just a ton of really interesting and novel stuff in this book. And, there is also
a lot of neat stuff ‘‘under the hood’’ that isn’t (explicitly) discussed in the book (e.g.,
some very powerful and ingenious computer programs for calculating and proving
general claims about the sorts of probabilities Pollock has in mind). Working
through Thinking About Acting was challenging and edifying. I highly recommend it
to anyone interested in decision theory, probability, epistemology and/or various
other related fields. The only bad thing about this book is that it’s the last one John
Pollock had the opportunity to write.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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